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“The Army of Occupation”: Americans 
in the Canadian Northwest During 
World War II
Ken S. Coates and William R. Morrison
War has remarkable capacity to transform, and not only the lives of soldiers and civilians in its path. The most familiar manifesta-tions of its power are the horrifying results of combat: mass death, 
widespread destruction, and the attending economic and social dislocation. 
But war brings many other changes, both to vanquished and perhaps less 
obviously to victor. In the economic realm alone, there is the construction of 
military facilities that can be adapted for civilian postwar uses, tremendous 
geographical and industrial shifts in public and private sector investment, 
population displacement based on new employment opportunities, new 
gender roles, new purchasing patterns or limitations, and the like.
 Gerald Nash, in his path-breaking book The American West Transformed: 
The Impact of World War II (1985), has described how that war brought sweep-
ing changes into hitherto isolated parts of the United States. The most strik-
ing example of this process to take place in Canada during World War II oc-
curred in the far northwest of the country. As in the United States, it occurred 
not through direct military engagement but rather through the economic 
and social impact of defense construction, specifically through the invasion 
of the Canadian Northwest by a massive military and civilian “army of oc-
cupation.”
 The United States had long maintained a watching brief on the Canadian 
Northwest. Interest in the region, which began with the purchase of Alaska 
from the Russians in 1867 and peaked during the Klondike gold rush of 1897-
1899, was based on the recognition that British Columbia and the Yukon stood 
astride the logical path of communication between Alaska and the lower 48 
states. This recognition, over the years, had stimulated a number of sugges-
tions (most originating in Alaska) for road and railway projects to link Alaska 
to the south. but the Territory’s small population and the rapid decline of the 
Yukon stifled southern interest in the region. There had been some renewed 
activity during the late 1930s as the Canadian government began to build the 
Northwest Staging Route – a string of airfields from Edmonton, Alberta. to 
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Whitehorse and on to Alaska. But few outside the region paid much attention 
to the vast sub-Arctic expanse that lay to the northwest of the Alberta capital.
 This indifference vanished within a few days of the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor. With frantic demands for protection from the Pacific Coast 
states pouring into Washington, the American government quickly drew up 
plans for the defense of Alaska and the northwest flank of the continent, 
plans that become even more urgent when in 1942 the Japanese actually oc-
cupied American soil--the Aleutian islands of Kiska and Attu. Following a 
brief study and pro forma negotiations with the Canadian government, the 
United States announced in February 1942 that a road would be built con-
necting Alaska with the southern highway grid. The route chosen for the 
road (and there were several hotly competing plans) followed the existing 
and planned line of airfields from Edmonton to Fairbanks. The Alaska-
Canada (ALCAN) or, as it was soon called, the Alaska Highway, became the 
cornerstone of a massive American effort in the region.
 Although it was this highway that received most of the attention dur-
ing the war and after, the road was only one element in America’s plans for 
the Canadian Northwest. Taking what later proved to be very bad advice, 
the U.S. government also launched the CANOL Project, a scheme to develop 
the oil field at Norman Wells on the Mackenzie River in the Northwest 
Territories and to build a pipeline to carry the oil nearly 600 miles across 
the Richardson Mountains to a refinery in Whitehorse. From this refinery, 
which had to be constructed from scratch, shorter pipelines would carry pet-
roleum products along the Alaska Highway and down to the Pacific Coast at 
Skagway. The American authorities also undertook to expand the Northwest 
Staging Route into a much larger network, designed (after the summer of 
1942) to handle convoys of military planes ferried from American factories 
to Fairbanks, where they were turned over to Russian pilots for use on the 
Eastern front. There were a host of ancillary projects, such as a connecting 
road from the Alaska Highway to tidewater at Haines, Alaska, airfields and 
docking facilities along the Mackenzie River to supply the CANOL Project, 
a telephone system for the region, and a myriad of warehouses, dormitories, 
service facilities, garages, and other such structures. Eventually about 40,000 
military and civilian workers would work on these projects.
 This was not the first “invasion” of the Canadian Northwest, or even 
perhaps the most famous. At the end of the last century, the discovery of 
gold at Rabbit, now Bonanza, Creek near present day Dawson City touched 
off the great Klondike gold rush. Tens of thousands of prospectors flooded 
the region, raising its non-native population from zero in 1870 to about 
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40,000 in 1898. Communities sprang up, and a transportation system was 
developed with steamboats plying the Yukon River, a railroad running from 
Whitehorse to Skagway, and another railroad operating for a dozen years be-
tween Dawson City and the gold-bearing creeks, a hydroelectric system, and 
a telegraph line to the outside world – the infrastructure for an industrial-age 
frontier economy. But the gold- bearing creeks were quickly stripped of their 
richest deposits, and it soon became uneconomical to work them by hand. By 
1900, industrial capital was moving in to replace and displace the individual 
prospectors of Western legend, and massive dredges were chewing up the 
creeks where the Klondikers had worked their sluice boxes. The population 
began to shrink, reaching a low of just over 4,100 (of whom only 2,500 were 
non-native) by the early 1920s. By the outbreak of World War II, it was still 
under 5,000, and the region had been all but forgotten with only the popular 
writings of Robert Service and Jack London sustaining its mythology.
 And the Yukon, despite it somnolence, was one of the busier regions in 
the Canadian Northwest. Northern Alberta and the Mackenzie River Valley 
had boomed briefly following the discovery of oil at Norman Wells in 1920; 
but as was all too common in the North the promise of economic develop-
ment proved false; since there was plenty of oil in southern Alberta and in 
Texas, it was not economically feasible to bring northern oil to market. Thus, 
a pipeline to the south was not built for another 60 years. The Peace River 
country northwest of Edmonton, which had been settled after World War I, 
had attracted fugitives from the prairie Dust Bowl during the Depression but 
had not boomed as its promoters had hoped. Edmonton had touted itself as 
the gateway to the North and had achieved a population on the eve of war of 
about 90,000; but this was due more to its role as provincial capital than to its 
northerly location. Northern British Columbia was largely undeveloped. The 
provincial road system petered out where farmland turned to bush a few 
miles north of Fort St. John; north of that, the land was still trapping country, 
where the native people pursued their traditional hunting and gathering 
way of life.
 Much of this was changed by the war and the arrival of the Americans. 
Within a month of the decision to build the Alaska Highway, engineers and 
support crews arrived in the region, followed by thousands, then tens of thou-
sands, of military and civilian workers. Almost overnight the isolation and 
economic depression that had gripped the region were swept away. The first 
to arrive on the scene were members of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
who had the responsibility for the construction of the initial pioneer road to 
Alaska and the preliminary work on the CANOL Project. They were soon 
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followed by a large group of civilian workers, mostly American but with a 
good proportion of Canadians, whose job was to bring the Army’s rough 
road up to civilian standards, to complete the pipeline and the refinery, and 
to finish the other projects in the region. 
Map 2. From William R. Morrison and Kenneth A. Coates, Working the North: Labor and the 
Northwest Defense Projects 1942-1946 (Anchorage: University of Alaska Press, 1994).
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 The communities in the path of these projects were almost instantly 
transformed by them. Whitehorse, a seasonal transportation village that was 
to become the key regional administrative center for the highway, saw its 
population grow from less than 800 to more than 10,000 between March and 
May of 1942. Dawson Creek and Fort Nelson, small villages in northeastern 
British Columbia, saw their populations double and redouble. Tiny places 
like Fort Smith, Waterways, Norman Wells, and Watson Lake were trans-
formed from isolated trading posts into important construction depots.
 Though some communities mushroomed, at least one withered as a re-
sult of the construction projects. Dawson City, then the capital of the Yukon 
and the Territory’s commercial as well as administrative center, was bypassed 
by the Alaska Highway, which ran more than 300 miles south of it. Except for 
some Yukon River barges, which went by the town loaded with construction 
equipment, there was no benefit to Dawson City from the defense projects. 
In fact, the opposite was true. The relatively high wages paid to the civil-
ian workers on the highway drew workers away from the Klondike mines. 
Several local businesses – the dry cleaner, the glazier, and others – moved 
to Whitehorse to share in the prosperity. Whitehorse ended the war with a 
population of 3,600, while its northern rival had declined from about 1,500 to 
less than 700. Whitehorse had highway connections to the rest of the contin-
ent, while Dawson City was not connected to the Canadian highway system 
until 1955 (a road from Dawson City west to Alaska was built in 1951). In 1953 
the Territorial capital was moved south to the town on the Alaska Highway, 
while Dawson was barely kept alive by the gold mining industry. It was re-
vived as a tourist destination in the 1960s by large infusions of government 
money, but its permanent year-round population today is not much more 
than 1,000, while Whitehorse exceeds 20,000.
 Had the Alaska Highway planners chosen a more central route, which 
many people had recommended and which would have made more eco-
nomic sense than the present one, the figures today would be reversed. The 
greatest single change brought about by the Americans was to the town of 
Whitehorse. As mentioned, the highway eventually made it the new capital 
of the Yukon, but it was also physically transformed. Into a sleepy village 
with one cafe, no sewage or water supply system, a doubtful supply of elec-
tricity, and a telephone system that had no connection to the outside world, 
marched 10,000 newcomers. The cafe was overwhelmed, and new ones went 
up overnight. The small hotels and boarding houses were swamped, and men 
rented rooms by the eight-hour shift or slept on the floor. The small govern-
ment liquor store (the sale of liquor is a government monopoly everywhere 
“THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION”
60
in Canada) was besieged by long lines of thirsty customers. Bootleggers 
and prostitutes arrived in town, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
increased the size of its detachment to keep them under control. By 1945, 
Whitehorse had changed forever, and the town was left with an array of 
modern facilities, as well as the largest number of baseball fields per capita of 
any community in Canada. Nine years later, Pierre Berton, Canada’s leading 
popular historian and a native of the Yukon, described the town as
a cluttered hodgepodge of wartime jerry building, a wild mel-
ange of tarpaper shacks, outhouses, bunk- houses, Quonset huts, 
corrugated iron lean-tos . . . all mingled with piles of salvaged 
lumber and piping, rusted hulks of trucks and bulldozers, and 
scattered heaps of old oil drums. This was the mess left behind by 
the army…. Whitehorse was still cleaning up after them.1
 The impact of the Alaska Highway and related projects on the native 
people of the Canadian Northwest is a topic of some debate today. One 
school of thought holds that the highway marked a watershed in the lives of 
the natives; and there is a good deal of evidence to support this view. Some 
native people of the southern Yukon suffered in a dramatic and terrible way 
from the arrival of outsiders. Although they had been in periodic contact 
with traders and miners for a century before the highway was built, it had 
always taken newcomers weeks to travel in the north, by which time they 
were presumably no longer in the infectious stage of whatever disease they 
carried. In 1942, the natives were thrust into contact with people who had 
flown into their country in a single day from the United States. The result 
was a wave of epidemics like measles, mumps, whooping cough, hepatitis, 
meningitis, and influenza – the community of Teslin experienced eight of 
them in the winter of 1942-1943. In that year the native population of the 
region actually declined, as deaths, particularly of children, outnumbered 
births.
 There was also a sexual aspect to the American invasion. In the 800 miles 
of bush country between Dawson Creek, British Columbia, and Whitehorse, 
and between Whitehorse and the Alaska border, there was a very small 
resident white population, only a few hundred at most, concentrated in 
small settlements like Fort Nelson and Fort St. John. There were almost no 
single white women outside of these communities. Of the tens of thousands 
of military and civilian workers, almost all of them lonely and bored, there 
was a small number prepared to prey on native women, given the chance. 
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Although the American authorities made strenuous efforts by means of 
recreational activities, stern warnings, and harsh punishments to deflect or 
prevent the exploitation of native women, there were a number of incidents 
of sexual molestation.
 During the war there were a few assaults on native women as well as 
two or three cases of assault on white women. The offenders were dealt 
with swiftly and harshly (specifically the isolated incident in which a black 
soldier was accused of assaulting a white woman), partly because of the 
racist atmosphere in which they took place and partly because they were 
a diplomatic embarrassment to the United States. The American authorities 
wanted to avoid giving offense to the Canadians and wished to be seen as 
good neighbors and good allies.
 Although some women worked on the Northwest defense projects, the 
majority served in clerical positions in Edmonton, the main administrative 
center, or in one of the regional centers like Whitehorse or Dawson Creek. 
Only a very small number worked in isolated camps as clerks, cooks, and 
nurses, and their living quarters were rigidly segregated. These women 
were very much in demand for dances and social outings arranged by the 
authorities to give some semblance of a normal social life in the wilderness. 
One woman who worked in Whitehorse during the war remembered it as 
“paradise for a young girl, with all these men around... you had a date with a 
different fellow every night... We were flown into different air force stations 
around for weekends... they’d really show us a good time.”2
 On the whole, however, there was far less sexual activity between the 
Americans and the local population in the far Northwest than in other the-
aters during the war. Most of the evidence for this assertion is anecdotal, 
but a telling statistic was that the venereal disease rate for the troops in the 
region varied between three and five cases per thousand per year, a figure 
that was only 10 percent of that for the entire U.S. Army (42 cases per thou-
sand), and the majority of such cases occurred among troops returning to the 
North from leave in the lower 48 states. The basic cause for this low statistic 
was the lack of sexual opportunity – the region was so isolated and sparsely 
populated that there were not even enough prostitutes to cause the author-
ities much worry.
 Although from one perspective the Northwest defense projects were 
seen to have a lasting influence on the region, from another perspective, they 
can be seen as having only a short-term effect on the native people (apart 
from the mortality statistics, which are irrefutable). The projects, though 
massive, were not carried out on a wide front; rather, they went through a 
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very narrow corridor. The inhabitants of Teslin were unfortunate enough 
to be in the path of the highway, but most of the natives of the Northwest 
were not. If they wished to avoid the newcomers, and most did, it was easy 
enough to do so. Some sought employment with the projects, particularly as 
guides and packers in the early stages of construction, while others made 
souvenirs that were eagerly bought by the soldiers. But most kept away from 
the highway, preferring to continue their life on the land; and since the fur 
trade continued to be profitable until after the end of the war, there was no 
reason for them to abandon it. What really changed the lives of the region’s 
native people forever was not the highway but the advent of the Canadian 
welfare state after the end of the war.
 Particularly important was the Mothers’ Allowance (or “baby bonus,” as 
it is often called) – a monthly payment to all mothers which was introduced in 
1944. In order for payments to be received, the children had to attend school; 
and it was the lure of this money as much as anything that began to draw the 
native people off the land and into permanent communities. Another twist 
to the baby bonus was that in the North, though nowhere else in Canada, 
the payment was made in kind rather than in cash, because the natives were 
deemed not responsible enough to spend the money wisely. Thus they had to 
take it in supplies, not ones of their own choosing but government-approved 
goods (oatmeal rather than sweetened cereal, and the like). After this came 
all manner of other government programs; and it was these, not the highway, 
that really eroded the old way of life.
 Another charge that was leveled both at the time and after against the 
Americans was that they had wantonly destroyed the stocks of game and 
fish in the region. Then, as now, Americans had a reputation among foreign-
ers of being trigger-happy, and the legendary soldier shooting anything 
that moved with pearl-handled revolvers, or strafing helpless moose from a 
fighter plane, was a stock figure of anti-American mythology. There is some 
truth to this legend. Many of the civilian and military workers were anxious 
to hunt large game, partly for sport and partly to supplement their monoton-
ous diet of Spam, dried potatoes, and canned Vienna sausage. Moose or deer 
meat was a treat eagerly sought after, and the military high command held 
out the privilege of hunting as a reward for good behavior. There were a 
number of complaints from residents of the region about over-hunting. But 
as with other matters, hunting must be put into perspective. Not all of the 
men wished to hunt, and even fewer had the bush skills to stray very far from 
the narrow construction corridors. Thus, although there was a considerable 
degree of over-hunting and over-fishing in the region, it was confined to 
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a small area; and the game which lived farther afield was not molested. It 
was, however, fear of destruction of game that led to the establishment of the 
Kluane Game Preserve in the southwest corner of the Yukon in 1942, a move 
that eventually led to the creation of Kluane National Park, which is now a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site.
 Damage to the environment was, on the other hand, a more serious 
matter, and one that caused lasting resentment among the region’s native 
people. The agreement between Canada and the United States under which 
the projects were built permitted the Americans to use whatever natural re-
sources they needed to complete their task, and there were no environmental 
constraints at all on their activities. The projects used phenomenal amounts 
of the region’s timber, both for construction and for heating: The military 
establishment in Whitehorse and Watson Lake alone used 18,000 cords of 
firewood in 1942-1943, amounting to a pile four feet wide, four feet high, and 
over 27 miles long – a significant depletion of the not particularly abundant 
timber resources of the Southern Yukon. There was also some wanton de-
struction – spillage of diesel fuel that caused damage to creek beds that was 
still apparent 20 years after the war’s end and the fouling of rivers by care-
lessly built latrines. There were also a number of forest fires, many caused 
by careless smokers, that destroyed hundreds of acres of timber throughout 
the Northwest. One incident, which illustrates an all too common attitude 
toward the environment, occurred when a man was ordered to deliver a load 
of diesel fuel to a remote construction camp. When he arrived at the camp 
he found no one there, nor could he find the storage tank for the fuel. Not 
wishing to wait, he dumped the 1,000- gallon load of fuel on the ground and 
returned to his base.
 Some of the damage done to the environment came through careless-
ness and indifference, some through haste, and some through ignorance of 
the terrain in which the projects were built. Few, if any, of the builders and 
planners had any experience with permafrost and muskeg. The original pi-
oneer road that the Army Corps of Engineers built – 1,500 miles in the amaz-
ingly short period of eight months – was pushed through the bush by brute 
force: Bulldozers knocked down the trees, machines tore up the stumps, 
pull-blades gouged the soil to form a crown on a dirt road, wooden culverts 
were laid where streams crossed the road, and log and pontoon bridges were 
thrown across creeks and rivers. Fortunately for the success of the enterprise, 
the Army’s road was finished in November 1942, just as the Northwest froze 
solid. With the spring thaw of 1943, however, the muskeg melted and the 
exposed permafrost turned to thick mud, the little streams swelled and tore 
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out the culverts, and the rivers flooded and ripped out dozens of bridges. The 
Alaska Highway became impassable, and virtually the entire road had to be 
rebuilt by the Public Works Administration.
 Perhaps the most egregious example of the ignorance and naiveté about 
the environment was the CANOL Project. Viewed from a “can-do” perspec-
tive, the project was an immense success. Hundreds of tons of four- and six- 
inch steel pipe, heavy equipment, and supplies of all kinds had to be taken 
from the railhead at Fort McMurray or Waterways in north-central Alberta 
down the Peace River- Slave Lake-Mackenzie River system to Norman Wells, 
a distance of about 1,200 miles. It was not “unknown” country, as fur traders, 
in particular the Hudson’s Bay Company, had operated in the region for well 
over a century. But it was undeveloped country with a small transportation 
system consisting mostly of the Hudson’s Bay Company’s river steamer, 
which supplied the small fur trade posts along the route. Drilling 19 new 
wells at Norman Wells, laying out the pipeline route and the accompanying 
road across the country to Whitehorse, and building all the ancillary facilities 
proved to be a marvel of logistical organization. Over 10,000 troops and as 
many civilians were at work on the project at its peak in the summer of 1943.
 But from an environmental perspective the project was a disaster. The 
construction techniques were primitive: bulldozers had cleared a path 
through the bush, pushing trees to one side and piling dirt and muskeg into 
a rough service road. The sections of pipe were welded together and the com-
pleted pipeline laid directly on the ground. And because the greater part of 
the route ran through permafrost country, the pipeline route soon turned 
into bog, the ground shifting and subsiding, often breaking the pipe and 
leading to spills. Moreover, a great deal of the work on the project was done 
by troops who hated their task. The racial policy of the U.S. Army in World 
War II was beset by a basic contradiction. On one hand, black troops were 
popularly believed to be incapable of serving effectively in cold climates, 
presumably due to their African heritage. On the other hand, the authorities 
were anxious to send them to theaters far from any large white population 
to minimize the possibility of racial friction – and it was the second policy 
that prevailed in this case. This is why thousands of black troops served on 
the Alaska Highway, where temperatures could go well below -40°F, and on 
the CANOL Project, where the weather could be even colder. Dispirited and 
demoralized troops meant shoddy workmanship, and the CANOL Project 
was plagued with breakdowns and defects of all kinds.
 In the long run, these efforts went for nothing. Delays in building the 
refinery at Whitehorse and the pumping stations along the pipeline meant 
65
KEN S. COATES AND WILLIAM R. MORRISON
that CANOL did not begin operations until August 1944, by which time its 
rationale had vanished since it had long been clear that the Japanese were 
no longer a threat to any part of the continental United States. Oil flowed 
through the line only for a few months, between breakdowns, and it was 
closed in March 1945 and dismantled in 1946. It had cost about $135 million, 
a large sum 50 years ago, and was such a flagrant example of war-time waste 
and bad planning that it became the chief “whipping boy” of the Truman 
Committee, the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense 
Program, which met toward the end of the war to expose waste in defense 
spending.
 There is a second rumor, as persistent as the one about the trigger-happy 
Americans, that stills echoes in the Canadian Northwest. It dates from the 
end of the war when the construction activities were winding down and 
thousands of Americans were dismantling the CANOL Project, turning the 
Alaska Highway over to the Canadian Department of National Defence, and 
returning home. The gist of the rumor is that the Americans, unable to carry 
home all their supplies and equipment and unwilling to simply give them 
away to local residents, wantonly destroyed vast quantities of perfectly good 
food, vehicles, machinery, and other goods of all kinds. Witnesses claimed to 
have seen jeeps in operating condition driven into pits and buried or set on 
fire, hundreds of sides of beef, scores of dozens of sheets and towels doused 
with gasoline and burned. The Northwest was abuzz with indignation over 
the alleged dog-in-the-manger policy of the departing Yankees. An investi-
gation was held, and the rumors were officially denied. The truth of the mat-
ter, as with many folk legends of this kind, is not easy to determine; but the 
explanation seems to run as follows: The Americans took back to the United 
States everything they considered worth saving. But value was a matter of 
perception, and there was a great deal of equipment that was not in first-class 
shape but that had considerable utility for local residents. An example was 
wood-burning stoves, which the Americans had brought in by the score. A 
wood stove with a damaged door would not be taken back to the lower 48 
states; yet it could have been repaired locally and used, or parts could have 
been taken from several stoves to make one good one. Yet if the authorities 
had permitted people to do this kind of salvage, local merchants would have 
complained, and the dumps where such goods were thrown would have 
swarmed with would-be entrepreneurs. The simplest course then was to put 
all the stoves in a pile and run a bulldozer over them, and this was generally 
the course taken. In a marginal society, this was naturally seen as wanton 
waste and selfishness. Nevertheless, there was a tremendous amount of pil-
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fering, and local residents boasted that they had scrounged enough sheets 
and towels to last a generation. This pattern of wastage was one of the un-
happier results of the whole enterprise.
* * *
 In the long run, the activities of the Americans in the Canadian Northwest 
had a dramatic and crucial effect on the region’s history and development. 
The Canadian North, and the Northwest in particular, had long been ig-
nored by the central government, which paid attention to it only when some-
thing dramatic like the Klondike gold rush occurred. At other times, it was a 
forgotten stepchild, pushed aside while regions considered more important 
were developed. When the Northwest defense projects were approved at the 
beginning of 1942, the Canadian government assigned one man to act as li-
aison officer between Ottawa and the upwards of 40,000 foreign military and 
civilian workers active in the region, then went to sleep and allowed them 
to do as they pleased. It was no wonder that another rumor spread that the 
clerk who ran the switchboard at the U.S. Army headquarters in Edmonton 
answered calls with a cheery “Good morning, U.S. Army of Occupation.” It 
was not until Malcolm Macdonald, the British High Commissioner to Canada 
(the equivalent of ambassador), made a trip through the region and warned 
Ottawa that Canadian sovereignty was likely to come into question if it did 
not take a closer interest in the region that the government bestirred itself. 
And even then it only went so far as to appoint a Special Commissioner to 
deal with matters of concern to both countries. A number of journalists were 
permitted to travel the highway and pipeline and write stirring accounts, and 
the publicity these stories generated did keep the projects in the eye of the 
government as well as the public. In large measure, the war had awakened 
the Canadian government to its responsibilities toward the Northwest; and 
in that sense, the defense projects were the catalyst that brought the region 
into the Canadian mainstream.
 But this awakening had no practical effect before 1945. Until then, the 
United States Army and the American civilian contractors who built the 
Alaska Highway and the other projects operated as if they were still in 
the United States, or as if they were in a conquered country. The American 
government insisted on and received the right of extraterritoriality of U.S. 
citizens, military and civilian, which meant that any American accused of 
a crime, no matter how serious, committed against anyone in the region, 
soldier or civilian, could be tried only by an American military court while 
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Canadian courts had no jurisdiction. The U.S. Military Police patrolled the 
Alaska Highway along with the RCMP; and in the more settled regions, like 
Whitehorse and Dawson Creek, British Columbia, they caused a good deal 
of resentment among the local population by their habit of bullying civilians 
and throwing their weight around. The Member of Parliament for the Yukon 
referred to them as “Gestapo,” and there were a number of nasty incidents in 
which innocent citizens were knocked about or insulted by the MPs.
 On the other hand, there were many people in the Northwest who had 
welcomed the arrival of the Americans. The projects provided jobs at good 
wages for hundreds of local civilians who had scratched their way through 
the depression of the 1930s. Schoolteachers from Saskatchewan, who had 
worked in rural schoolhouses for $50 a month plus board and considered 
themselves lucky to have any job, found themselves driving a truck for an 
Alaska Highway contractor for $100 a week. The defense projects were the 
foundation of many a small business and farm in Western Canada. For 
young people in the region, as elsewhere in the world, the Yankees were rich 
and generous visitors, not threatening strangers. One teenager in Dawson 
Creek, for instance, found a way to profit from the invasion. In July 1943, a 
troop train had derailed near the town in the middle of a heat wave:
So I thought, what a market. These guys are all complaining 
about the thirst. . . . I raced into town , got a couple of cream cans 
. . . chopped up a bunch of ice in a local ice house, threw it in the 
can, went to the well and pumped it full of ice cold water, went 
flying down the road, six inches off the ground, down to the train 
wreck, and the soldiers just gathered round. I didn’t charge them 
... just make a donation . . . I got American dollars left and right 
and I got, I don’t know, $20 a can for that water . . . you know, 
my pants were hanging down, loaded with money from these 
rich Americans who were just delighted with a drink of ice cold 
water.3
 In 1946, the United States transferred control of the Alaska Highway and 
its ancillary facilities to the Canadian Army and pulled the last of their per-
sonnel out of the Northwest. They had arrived in 1942 in a whirlwind of ac-
tivity, had changed much in their path, and had left the region substantially 
transformed. True, the lives of its native people, at least those who lived away 
from the highway corridor, were largely unaltered; but the region itself had 
been profoundly changed. That this was accomplished by foreigners says 
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a great deal about Canada’s attitude toward its north. Only in the past two 
generations has Canada taken an active and lasting interest in the welfare 
and development of its vast northern lands. Before World War II, such inter-
est was sporadic, as with the Klondike gold rush. Since the arrival of the 
Americans in the Northwest, Canada has assumed a responsibility for the 
region that it has never relinquished. This responsibility has grown, so that 
the Northwest is now well integrated into the Canadian nation.
 The Canadian Northwest had experienced a peaceful occupation. The 
region’s people and their government had welcomed the arrival of the 
Americans and had applauded their energy, their engineering skills, and 
their bottomless supply of cash. But the Americans went home in 1946, leav-
ing behind a highway not yet finished to civilian standards, a “white ele-
phant” refinery and pipeline system, and traces of a huge military and civil-
ian complex. For the Northwest, the occupation had brought many changes 
– new transportation systems, changed settlement patterns, visions of post-
war prosperity, environmental damage, increased Canadian government 
interest in the region, and upheaval in some native communities. By 1946 
a new Northwest was emerging, transformed profoundly by the American 
occupation.
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